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Case Histories for Today's Geotechnique
R. B. Peck
Civil Engineer, Geotechnics, Albuquerque, NM

INTRODUCTION

Third, case histories demonstrated how reasonable solutions to engineering problems could be
achieved by means of the observational method
even when subsurface conditions were complex
and, to a degree, unpredictable. The adoption
of the observational method in geotechnical engineering (Peck 1969) would certainly not have
come to pass without many excellent case histories that demonstrated not only successful
techniques, but the accomplishments and shortcomings of the method.

Following the Ninth International Conference on
Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering in
Tokyo, the Japanese Organizing Committee published a Case History Volume for which I was
asked to write an introduction. The paper that
I submitted (Peck 1981) expressed in a rather
formal way my views on the function and value
of case histories in geotechnical engineering.
You would not want me to repeat those comments
now. I shall, therefore, briefly recapitulate
my main points for the Tokyo Volume and pass on
to the somewhat narrower subject of the kinds
of case histories that may be most useful to us
today.

The case histories that I wish to emphasize in
this presentation fall in still another category. They might be described as examples of
the unexpected or, at ~east, unforeseen.

In the early days of soil mechanics, there were
three principal uses for case histories. The
first, applicable only if soil conditions were
unusually uniform and simple, was to verify or
establish fundamental principles. For example,
as recently as 40 years ago it was by no means
certain that the formulas for bearing capacity
of footings on clay were reliable. The classical paper by Skempton (1942), in which he provided the essential facts concerning the failure of a single footing for an industrial
building and showed that the failure load
agreed with that predicted on the basis of theory and undrained strength, is in this category. Without such investigations, the engineering profession would not have been justified in
accepting the principles and procedures of soil
mechanics, and undoubtedly would not have done
so.

In the successful application of the observational procedure, it is essential to have a
perception of all the things that might go
wrong. That is, the engineer needs a reasonable knowledge of subsurface conditions and a
realistic conception of possible departures
from these conditions. Part of the observational procedure is to make plans in advance to
cope with even the most unfavorable of these
departures if they shou~d indeed prevail. If
the engineer fails to foresee a possible mode
of failure, or if perhaps the unexpecte~ condition is not even in the rea1m of geotechnics,
the observational procedure may not be adequate
to prevent a failure or a disappointing performance.
Case histories embodying experiences of this
sort can hardly be classified in such a way as
to provide a checklist to help the engineer
realize the possibilities of such surprises.
Nevertheless, by recounting a few, perhaps I
can demonstrate the kinds of unexpected developments that we might try to anticipate. In
the effort to avoid such surprises, we may discover that we must go beyond the limits of our
own specialty.

The second category of case histories was those
that contrasted theory and reality. Theory,
for example, had demonstrated the conditions
under which piping by heave. would occur near
the downstream toe of a dam on pervious cohesionless deposits. The grain size of the material was shown, not only by theory but by
laboratory tests, to be irrelevant. Yet, the
extensive case histories, such as those collected by E. w. Lane (1935), showed without a
doubt that many piping failures were related to
the grain size. Moreover, in contrast to the
predictions of the theory, the failures usually
occurred some time after first filling of the
reservoir. Thus, the case histories required
re-examination of the basis for the theory, and
led to recognition of the importance of another
form of piping, failure by subsurface erosion.

some of these case histories have been presented before. I repeat them because different
lessons appear when they are viewed in a different context.
FROZEN FIRE LINES
The Grant Park North underground garage in Chicago is a two-story parking structure floating
in the soft clay underlying Grant Park and Michigan Avenue near Lake Michigan. The structure is a reinforced-concrete flat-slab box
907

First International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering
Missouri University of Science and Technology
http://ICCHGE1984-2013.mst.edu

with plan dimensions of about 600 by 2000 feet.
Although the box and :i.ts contents weigh substantially less than the excavated soil, the
design of a structure of such large dimensions
without deep foundations was perhaps unprecedented in 1950, and J: was rather proud of my
part in it. Furthermore, the differential settlement of the structure proved to be small and
the undertaking was considered a success,

BEDROCK DISSOLUTION
I have recounted elsewhere (Peck 1969) the story of an industrial plant with many buildings
on shallow foundations underlain by about 50
feet of soft clay. The buildings showed signs
of progressive settlement. When I was asked to
make an investigation, I learned that sodium
chloride brine had for many years been produced
by pumping from well.s extending through the
clay and underlying bedrock.to depths ranging
from 800 to 1100 feet. I also learned that it
had not been necessary for many years to furnish water to the injection wells into the
brine supply because the well casings had corroded near the boundary between the clay and
the bedrock, where a thin deposit of waterbearing gravel furnished enough water through
the defective casings to dissolve the salt and
produce brine.

During design there was considerable discussion
with the fire marsha~ over provisions to assure
a sufficient supply of high-pressure water in
the event of a fire.
The engineer in charge of
the design had intended to include large-diameter water pipes in each of the two levels,
Since the ventilation system would pump outside
air through the structure 1 the engineer recognized that in cold weather the temperature in
the garage could be we~~ below freezing. He
envisioned, therefore, that the pipes would be
empty except in the event of a fire, when
valves would be opened and the water made
available. The fire marshal decreed, however,
that the pipes should a~ways be filled with
water. Hence, the des:ign was modified to place
the water pipes beneath the foundation slab of
the garage at a depth thought to be sufficient
to prevent freezing.
The design also included
high-pressure pumps that would be activated to
increase the flow of water if there should be a
demand.

The magnitude and rate of settlement seemed to
agree quite satisfactorily with what would be
expected if the clay deposit were underdrained,
as indeed it must have been by the l.eaky injection wells. Since the settlement calculated on
this basis seemed to agree reasonably well with
the results of the observations, I proposed remedial measures appropriate to this cause.
When Terzaghi read my report, as he did for
most of my early jobs, his immediate reaction
was that I had overlooked the main cause' subsidence of the bedrock overlying the zones from
which the salt had been extracted. Inasmuch as
the rock above the salt formations was competent limestone or sandstone, I was initially
incredulous. Terzaghi was aware, however, of
similar problems in Europe in which not only
subsidence but sinkholes had developed. After
he convinced me, I had the unpleasant task of
explaining my conversion to my client, who was
equally incredulous. I was demoted to being a
member of a three-man consulting board, of
which Terzaghi was the chairman, during the ensuing investigation.

In January 1963 Chicago experienced a succession of days with temperatures well below 0° F,
As luck would have it 1 J: was visiting a job in
Hawaii, quite oblivious to cold temperatures in
Chicago, when I received a cablegram stating
that the garage had fai~ed and that I shoul.d
come to Chicago immed.iately, When I arrived, I
found that Michigan Avenue was closed, and that
many of the columns :i.n the garage had failed
structurally as if they had been bent in a
giant testing machine. The sequence of events
established during the ensuing investigation
was the following 1 The water in the pipes beneath the floor froze, whereupon some of the
pipes broke. As soon as the temperature rose
enough to melt the ice, water began to flow
from the broken pipes. With the flow of water,
the high-pressure pumping system went into action and furnished water so rapidly that a
great lense of water formed beneath the floor
sl.ab. The lense lifted the interior portion of
the slab several inches with respect to the
boundaries, introduced ~arge bending deformations into the col.umns, and fractured them. By
the time the water was turned off, the damage
was done. Repairs, consisting of jackets
around the broken co~umns and other remedial
measures 1 were very costl.y, not to mention the
inconvenience associated with closing Michigan
Avenue until safety cou~d be assured.

I fell into a trap on this job because I was
looking far too narrowl.y at the evidence. Because I thought I knew the answer, I did not
even consider the possibility of other causes.
Terzaghi had the advantage of a precedent about
which I did not know. However, I should have
examined all the evidence before coming to a
conclusion.
CAVERNOUS LIMESTONE
The remedial work carried out by the Corps of
Engineers between 1975 and 1979 to rehabilitate
Wolf Creek Dam in Kentucky is well known,
through its extensive coverage in both the engineering literature (Fetzer 1979) and the news
media. The dam, which retains Lake Cumberland,
one of the largest bodies of water in the eastern United States, was completed in 1.951. It
included a rolled-fill. embankment section
founded on al.luvium which rested, in turn, on a
highly solutioned limestone. After 15 years of
service in which no signs of distress were noticed, sinkholes, subsidences, and muddy outflows appeared with increasing frequency and
severity. After an extensive investigation it
was decided to construct a continuous diaphragm
wall, through the embankment and al.luvium, deep

In retrospect, the sequence of events seems almost inevitable. At the time of design, however 1 such a scenario did not occur to anyone
associated with the project, certainly not to
me 1 to the enqineer in charge of design 1 to the
structural engineers, or to the fire marshal.
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enough into the limestone to cut off
all zones in which solution cavities
The work, unprecedented in its depth
culty, was accomplished successfully
draining the lake.

virtually
existed.
and diffiwithout

and cutoff was required. This was, of course,
one of the seats of the future trouble.
World War II caused cancellation of the contract when the foundation treatment was complete, and from August 1943 to September 1946
no work was done. By 1946, the value of en9ineering geology was more fully appreciated and
there was recognition that the foundation
treatment might have been more extensive had
the project been started in 1946 instead of
1941. Because the foundation was completed,
however, the new contract called for continuing
with the embankment on the original foundation.
Only after 15 years did the defects begin to
manifest themselves.

Were the dam to be designed today, both engineering geologists and geotechnical engineers
would undoubtedly assess significance of the
karstic foundation and, if evaluation of the
conditions warranted construction of the project, would take appropriate defensive measures
to minimize the adverse effects of the solution
channels. There would, under those circumstances, be no case history to fit into the
theme of this paper. However, the dam was designed in the late 1930's and constructed, with
an intermission during world War II, between
1941 and 1951. The Corps of Engineers, among
the pioneers in application of soil mechanics
to earth-dam design and construction, applied
the new discipline extensively in designing
Wolf Creek Dam. It was not the state of the
art of soil mechanics that failed them: it was
the emphasis placed on the part of the design
into which soil mechanics fit neatly, and the
lack of corresponding attention to the implications of engineering geology, which had not yet
emerged as a discipline. Thus, the detrimental
developments were, at the time, totally unexpected by the designers.

In the enthusiasm of the early successes of
soil mechanics, the designers and their Board
of Consultants devoted their attention largely,
to what seemed to be the state of the art - the
safety of the embankment and the alluvial foundation. These aspects were important. But so
were the implications of the solutioned limestone. They may have received less than their
deserved attention because the designers and
their consultants had new analytical tools with
which to solve problems of dam design, were
trained more in the use of these tools than by
experience in the broad field of dam design,
and quite naturally solved the problems that
they perceived were the important ones.

During the design phase, Corps geologists had
developed the stratigraphy and called attention
to the solution cavities. A consulting geologist, familiar with the area, had prepared an
excellent report in which he fully described
the nature and occurrence of the cavities, but
in which he did not presume to discuss the engineering aspects. The designers, quite reasonably, decided to carry a cutoff wall through
the upper, most solutioned, part of the foundation rock and to supplement the cutoff with a
grout curtain.

Could there be a lesson here for us today?
Could our facility with finite-element methods
and our interest in constitutive relations ansorb so much of our effort on some project that
we might quite unintentionally pass over a major source of weakness simply because our backgrounds are too specialized? I need not tell
you what I think the answer is.
ORE STORAGE YARD
The foregoing three case histories illustrate
events that were not only unexpected, but somewhat beyond the scope of soil mechanics. However, even within soil mechanics, through neglect, oversight, or overconfidence, a
potential mode of failure may be overlooked.
Such is the case in the following history.

The design of the embankment included stability
analyses for conditions during construction,
steady seepage, and drawdown. In recognition
that the alluvium might be a source of weakness, vertical drains were installed through
the alluvium to discharge into an overlying
drainage blanket that would also drain the
downstream shell of the embankment. Calculations by the theory of consolidation were made
to establish the spacing of the wells such that
the consolidation would keep pace with construction. All in all, the design, from the surface
of the bedrock upward, made use of the best
knowledge of the 1930's. Implicit in the design was the assumption that the alluvium-bedrock contact was a stable boundary.

In the years immediately preceding and following world War II, I investigated the stability
of a large number of storage yards for iron
ore. Most of these were located along the
Great Lakes where the ore necessary to keep
blast furnaces running through the winter was
piled between retaining walls supporting large
gantry cranes. The subsoil in most instances
included fairly thick deposits of soft to medium clays. Although it was usually possible to
make preliminary estimates of the capacity of
an ore yard by standard stability analyses, I
also made use of a technique for determining
the capacity independently by plotting the
movements of the retaining walls as a function
of the load per unit of area on various areas
of the ground surface adjacent to the walls.
This technique had proved useful on several
walls by the time I was asked to investigate
the behavior of a relatively new retaining
structure at Warren, Ohio.

When the area of the cutoff was exposed, it was
discovered that several deep solution channels
existed, one of which could be utilized as the
trench in which the cutoff could be constructed. The sides of the trench were locally cavernous, but the bottom appeared to be fairly
intact. It was decided to establish the grout
curtain from the bottom of the channel and to
place above it a compacted impervious cutoff at
least 10 feet wide. Large side caverns were
plugged with concrete: otherwise no special
compaction of the fill between the sidewalls
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to have m1n1mum volume. Airphoto and field sur·
veys then established the axes of the dikes to
take advantage of local topographic features.
Refraction seismic surveys were used extensive!~
to define the bedrock surface and numerous borings were made to determine subsurface conditions. Because of the remote and arctic conditions, borings were usually spaced at several
hundred feet, but where pervious conditions werE
encountered, estimates of permeability from
grain size determinations were often supplement•
ed by drillhole permeability tests.

The subsoil at warren, which is not located on
a waterway, was somewhat stiffer than that at
the ore yards close to a lake, and in the upper
part included a layer of silt. Yet the distortions of the gantry tracks were exceptionally
large. I went through what had become my customary routine and concluded that the proposal
of the steel company to provide the tracks with
a foundation that included vertical and batter
piles was reasonable.
Terzaghi and I had worked together on other ore
yards for the same company, and I was pleased
when the. chief engineer suggested that Terzaghi
should review my conclusions. When he did so,
he immediately pointed out that the silt layer
was undoubtedly transmitting large hydrostatic
pressure beyond the toes of the loaded ore pile
and the uplift exerted on the overlying soil
was probably sufficient to eliminate most of
the lateral resistance. Had the batter pile
solution been adopted without eliminating the
pressure in the silt layer, it is unlikely that
the movements would have been appreciably reduced. Terzaghi suggested that the silt layer
be drained by a system of permanent well
points.

It was known that several of the saddles were
underlain by deep bedrock valleys containing
glacial and alluvial deposits. Several similar
channels with a maximum depth of about 250 feet
had been encountered beneath Dike D-20 at the
LG-2 reservoir. The control measures at different locations consisted of slurry trench cutoffs
to glacial till, of excavated and backfilled
cutoffs to rock, and of upstream blankets. Whe~
the reservoir was raised, the performance of the
upstream blankets was excellent. Where defects
existed in the slurry trench section, a series
of relief wells was installed. The maximum flo~
from any of the wells was on the order of a few
hundred gallons per minute, and the total flow
beneath a one-mile length was about 3,000 gallons per minute.

As soon as Terzaghi pointed out the significance of the silt layer, I realized that I had
overlooked the one most vital point. From then
on, little input was needed from Terzaghi on
the project, but his quick recognition of my
oversight had made the difference between success and failure. Indeed, Terzaghi never quite
forgave me for my oversight.

At LG-3 several of the buried valleys extended
to depths of nearly 300 feet and there were indications of pervious material in the lower
parts. It was considered reasonable, and justified on the basis of the performance of D-20, to
provide upstream blankets with a gradient of
about 1:15 beneath most of these dikes. Several
of the dikes were essentially freeboard structures with very little head against them. Nevertheless, when the reservoir was being filled
for the first time, large concentrations of
seepage were noted at a few places downstream.
In one instance, before the water level actually
reached the elevation of the toe of the upstream
blanket which was located at a distance of several hundred feet from the axis of the dike,
flows on the order of 2000 gallons per minute
appeared downstream and a landslide with a 70foot scarp occurred in a steep slope about 3000
feet downstream from the dike.

After the successful completion of the job, I
prepared a paper under joint authorship with
Terzaghi (Terzaghi and Peck 1957) which was to
be presented at a meeting of the American society of Civil Engineers. Terzaghi was ambiguous as to whether he would attend, so I was
prepared to present the paper myself. He did
come, however, and while we sat together, waiting for the paper to be introduced, he still
did not tell me whether he, I, or both of us
would make the presentation. When we were introduced, he stood up and said, "I will present
the paper". His introductory remarks pointed
out that I had prepared a very sober account of
the project, that it could be read in due
course in the Proceedings of the ASCE, and that
he would talk about something else. He did so,
in entertaining fashion, somewhat to my discomfiture. I did not realize for some time
thereafter that he was, in his own way, punishing me for an inexcusable oversight.

It was apparent that the permeability of the
lower portion of some of the buried valleys was
far greater than had been anticipated. Accordingly, the reservoir was lowered and a program
of more detailed exploration undertaken. The
program resulted in the construction of additional cutoff walls at a cost of several million
dollars. Fortunately, the decrease in the market for power and the capabilities of the rest
of the system resulted in no loss of revenue on
account of lowering the reservoir, and indeed
the cost of the cutoff walls was favorable in
comparison to the probable cost had they been
built earlier in the construction period when
competition was less keen. In spite of these
fortunate conditions, the remarkably high permeability of some of the channels, which came as a
surprise, could have been responsible for large
economic losses.

CONTROLLED UNDERSEEPAGE
The last case I shall describe is not yet history. It deals with some of the dikes on the
LG-3 Reservoir of the James Bay project. The
reservoir is formed by the main LG-3 dam across
the Riviere LaGrande and 67 dikes with an aggregate length of 14 miles to close gaps in the
reservoir rim. The reservoir itself covers an
area of about 950 square miles (Murphy and Levay 1981). Following the procedure that had
been established for the LG-2 reservoir, the
general position of the reservoir rim was
established by tracing the contour of maximum
reservoir level and locating dikes in the various saddles at positions where they appeared

The observational procedure and careful surveillance identified the problems quickly and allowed the necessary remedial measures to be taket\.
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Lane, E. w. (1935). Security from underseepage - masonry dams on earth foundations.
Trans. ASCE, 100, PP• 1235-1531.

Nevertheless, the permeability and continuity
of the lower portions of the valley fills were
in some instances far greater than anyone had
anticipated. During construction of one cutoff
wall, clean boulders and cobbles, with sizes
ranging from 6 to 24 inches, were recovered
from a limited zone.

Murphy, D. K. and J. Levay (1981). Engineering
geology in the LaGrande Complex, Quebec. Preprint 81-111, May, ASCE, New York, 14 pp.

It can be said, with considerable justification, that the observational procedure was successful in this instance. Nevertheless, it is
appropriate to question whether techniques existed by which the conditions could have been
forecast more accurately at a reasonable expenditure of time and money.

Peck, R. B. (1969). Advantages and limitations
of the observational method in applied soil
mechanics. Giotechnique, 19, pp. 171-187.

The answer to this question seems to be negative, although the p~esence of an unusually
large number of rounded boulders on the surface
in the vicinity of one of the saddles, when
considered in its geomorphological context,
might have been a tipoff. A review of satellite and airphoto imagery suggests the presence
of pervious deposits in former streams, but the
evidence can hardly be considered indicative of
the extremely high and continuous permeability
encountered in the lower parts of a few deep
channels. Closer spacing of drill holes and
more extensive in-situ permeability testing
might have disclosed the conditions, but the
probability of missing the limited critical
zones would have remained, and the time and
cost for the investigations would probably have
been unreasonable.

Skempton, A. w. (1942) • An investigation of the
bearing capacity of a soft clay soil. J.
Inst. Civil Engrs., London, 18, PP• 307-321.

Peck, R. B. (1981). Case histories in soil
mechanics. Proc. 9th Int. Con£. Soil Mach.,
Tokyo, Case History Volume, pp. 1-14.

K. and R. B. Peck (1957). Stabilization of an ore pile by drainage. J. ASCE,
83, SMI, PP• ll44Jl-l3.

~erzaghi,

Hence, this case represents an example of a totally unexpected magnitude of permeability,
although the design.was premised on permeabilities that under most circumstances would themselves have been considered high. The observational procedure proved to be capable of coping
with the actual conditions and of assuring
safety, but the results would have been much
less tolerable had the opportunity not existed
for lowering the reservoir without appreciable
economic loss.
CONCLUSION
Most of the foregoing examples cannot be considered precedents in the sense that similar
conditions are often likely to be encountered
elsewhere. On the contrary, they serve primarily to indicate that the engineer should
make serious efforts to foresee potential unfavorable developments, not only those within
his own field of expertise, but also those that
lie outside his or possibly any other discipline. The broader the experience of the individual engineer, or the greater his ability
to work with people of other backgrounds, the
greater the likelihood that he will not be surprised by a totally unexpected development.
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